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The “Human Mental State Multiple Realizability in Silicon Thesis” is False:
An Argument Against Computational Theories of Consciousness
Matthew Piper
1. Abstract
Two of the most important concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind are
computation and consciousness. This paper explores whether there is a “strong”
relationship between these concepts in the following sense: is a computational theory
of consciousness possible? That is, is the right kind of computation sufficient for the
instantiation of consciousness? In this paper, I argue that the abstract nature of
computational processes precludes computations from instantiating the concrete
properties constitutive of consciousness. If this is correct, then not only is there no
viable computational theory of consciousness, the Human Mental State Multiple
Realizability in Silicon Thesis is almost certainly false.
2. Introduction
The HMSMRST is the Human-Mental-State-Multiple-Realizability-in-Silicon
Thesis, which holds that silicon-based systems having artificial experience1 can be
physically constructed (i.e., silicon-based machine consciousness is physically
possible). Although computers need not be made from silicon, they are the
archetypal, and most complex, silicon-based systems. So, on the most plausible
reading, the HMSMRST is true if computers can be conscious. Given that common
sense suggests that computers are not conscious, the burden for proponents of the
HMSMRST, given that the sine qua non of computers is computation, is to provide a
computational theory of consciousness.
In this paper, I argue that all computational theories of consciousness (CTCs)
fail. CTCs hold that the right kind of computation is sufficient for the instantiation of
consciousness. Given the widely-recognized importance of his work, I will use David
J. Chalmers’ Thesis of Computational Sufficiency as a paradigm case. I will argue
that it fails for a reason that can be formalized as a general problem plaguing any
CTC: the medium-independent properties (MIPs) constitutive of computational
processes are insufficient to instantiate the medium-dependent properties (MDPs)
constitutive of consciousness. MIPs, like graphemes, are properties whose causal role
(e.g., symbolic meaning) does not depend upon the physical properties of the vehicles
by which the relevant information is transferred (e.g., paper), while MDPs, like
digestion, have causal roles (e.g., decomposition) that directly depend on physical
properties of the relevant vehicles (e.g., enzymes). Since computations, as abstract
descriptions, are MIPs, they must be implemented to generate MDPs. However, this
makes potential implementation properties central to the feasibility of instantiating
consciousness in artificial systems.
1

“Artificial experience” denotes the instantiation of phenomenal consciousness in non-biological
artifacts/systems.
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The problems that arise for CTC advocates are two-fold, taxonomical and
empirical. The taxonomic problem is that adverting to detailed physio-causal
properties of implementation vehicles threatens to subvert the legitimacy of calling
such theories “computational.” The empirical problem is the following. Given the
necessary role of implementation properties, and the fact that functions supervene on
structures, it follows that physical differences can legislate mental differences. After
distinguishing weaker and stronger varieties of implementation requirements, and
showing why a plausible CTC requires a thick theory of implementation, I will
examine the implementation requirements for human consciousness. Given
empirical data suggesting that consciousness depends on very specific physical
properties of the brain, for which there are no known implementation surrogates, I
argue that CTCs will fail to generate the relevant MDPs. I will conclude by showing
why this implies that the HMSMRST is almost certainly false.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In § 3, I will explain Chalmers’
Thesis of Computational Sufficiency (TCS). In § 4, I will argue that Chalmers need
for implementation properties either makes his account computationally vacuous or
false, in the case of human consciousness. Either way, the TCS cannot carry the
weight asked of it. In § 5, I will respond to objections. In § 6, I will show that
Chalmers’ TCS fails for reasons that are applicable to all CTCs, and I will formulate a
general argument against CTCs based upon the difference between MIPs and MDPs.
In § 7, I will consider objections to this general argument. In § 8, I spell out the
implication of the foregoing for the HMSMRST, and then summarize the route taken
in § 9.2
3. Chalmers’ Thesis of Computational Sufficiency
In the essay, A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition (1994) 3,
Chalmers argues for the Thesis of Computational Sufficiency, which is essentially the
following:4
2

This paper will assume that one set of properties can realize another set of properties (e.g., structural
properties realizing functional properties).
Such property sets will, in general, be related
mereologically. In some cases, it is possible that what appears to be one set of properties (X) realizing
another (Y) is actually a case of one set of properties (X) known under two different modes of
presentation (X1 and X2) (cf. Shoemaker’s subset account of properties (2007)).
3
Despite the title of the paper in view, theories of cognition are not my target. I am not contesting
Chalmers’ claims in those regards, and am, in fact, sympathetic to many aspects of a computational
approach to cognition. That having been said, Fodor (2008) presents some key obstacles any theory of
cognition must overcome (esp. chapter 4). Thus, the CTC arguments presented here are tangential to
(and this paper is agnostic regarding) the viability of computational theories of cognition in general
(including Chalmers’).
4
This argument is also presented in chapters 7 and 9 of Chalmers (1996) book, The Conscious Mind.
The unpublished (1994) paper will be the chief reference as it is a relatively concise statement,
containing a minimum of extraneous material, whose import is generally recognized: notably, only 3
months after the submission of this paper to the Journal of Consciousness Studies, the Journal of
Cognitive Science announced a Call for Papers solely on responses to Chalmers’ unpublished (1994)
paper!
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(P1) “A computation provides an abstract specification of the causal organization of
a system.” (p. 11)
(P2) “Cognitive systems have their mental properties in virtue of their [abstract]
causal organization.” (p. 11)
(C1) “The right kind of computational structure suffices for possession of a mind.” (p.
1)
Let us look at each step of the argument.5
(P1) Chalmers’ argument rests upon a causal theory of computation (CC).
According to CC, a system implements computation X if there is an isomorphism
between the causal relations between the states of the physical system Y and the state
transitions specified by the formal description of X. Thus, the key feature is “that the
formal state-transitional structure of the computation mirrors the causal statetransitional structure of the physical system.” (Chalmers, 1994; p. 4) Given CC, P1
holds by definition: computations preserve abstract causal organization (ACO) since,
syntactically speaking, they are nothing above and beyond ACOs.
(P2) The idea behind P2 is that, unlike most properties, mental properties
depend only upon ACO. Properties depending only upon ACO are, in Chalmers’
words, “organizationally invariant.” By organizational invariance, Chalmers means
that “[i]t does not matter how we stretch, move about, or replace small parts of a
cognitive system: as long as we preserve its causal topology, we will preserve its
mental properties.” (ibid., p. 12) That is, Chalmers argues that mental properties
depend only upon the abstract organization of a system’s causal patterns and not the
causal realizers as such. In other words, as long as the ACO between two systems is
invariant, they will share the same mental properties, if any. In order to argue that
computation (individuated causally) is sufficient for the possession of a (conscious)
mind, Chalmers claims that mental properties are of two kinds, psychological and
phenomenological, and then argues that each kind of property is organizationally
invariant.
Psychological properties (Chalmers gives “belief and perception” as
examples) are declared to be those “characterized by their causal role” within an
overall causal system. Chalmers adverts to the work of Armstrong (1968) and Lewis
(1972) in claiming that “[s]ystems with the same causal topology…will share their
psychological properties” (Chalmers, 1994; p. 12). The basic idea is consonant with
Functionalist theories of mind, in which mental properties are individuated by their
5

Although the argument as stated here is formally invalid, it serves the purpose of presenting the basic
ideas in the author’s own words. Charitably, one valid form of the argument might be the following:
(P1) Computations = ACOs. (P2) The implementation of some ACOs is sufficient for realizing mental
properties. (C1) The implementation of some computations is sufficient for realizing mental
properties.

3

functional roles within a system, as opposed to any physical properties per se. If this
is right, then a CC should instantiate any psychological properties a system would
possess in virtue of preserving ACO.
Phenomenological properties, on the other hand, are not prima facie definable
in terms of their causal roles, as Chalmers himself admits. Establishing that
phenomenological properties can be accounted for via ACO therefore requires
argument. Chalmers provides his “Dancing Qualia” Argument (DQA) – a reductio –
for this purpose. Chalmers begins by assuming that agents with identical ACOs could
have different experiences in virtue of having different material constitutions (silicon
vs. neurons, e.g.), as type-physicalism might require. He then asks us to conceive of
changing one agent into the other by the replacement of parts (neural parts replaced
by silicon, say) while preserving its ACO.6 Ex hypothesi, the experience of the agent
under transformation would change (as the parts were replaced), but there would be
no change in abstract causal organization and therefore no means whereby the agent
could “notice,” as he puts it, the shift in experience. To imagine, however, that it
makes sense to say an agent could have qualitative changes in experience but be
unable to notice those changes in experience seems incoherent. Given the absurdity
of the conclusion, therefore, Chalmers’ rejects the initial premise that agents with
identical ACO can have different experiences. Thus, by his DQA, Chalmers defends
his view that phenomenological properties are organizationally invariant. Having
argued that both types of mental properties – psychological and phenomenological –
are organizationally invariant, Chalmers has defended P2.
(C1) In arguing for the TCS, Chalmers advocates a CC, in which a
computation is simply an abstract specification of causal organization. Accordingly,
if computations are ACOs, as P1 argues, and some ACOs are sufficient for mental
properties, as P2 argues, then some computations are sufficient for mental properties,
and C1, “the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a
mind,” straightforwardly follows. Interestingly, as Chalmers admits, there are no
positive proposals for what kind/type of computational structure is sufficient for
consciousness. In any case, to a first approximation, such is Chalmers’ argument for
the TCS.
The core point for our purposes is that Chalmers presents the TCS as a CTC.7
In other words, it holds that computation is sufficient for the instantiation of (both
psychological and phenomenological properties of) consciousness. Let us turn to a
critique of the TCS, arguably the most well-known and direct CTC on offer. After
exposing a critical dilemma, I will eventually argue that it is symptomatic of a more
general problem undermining all CTCs.
6

Of course, this assumes that the relevant causal organization can be preserved when changing
structures, which begs the question against type-physicalists. See below.
7
Chalmers’ TCS is arguably the clearest and most straightforward CTC. A small selection of other
authors developing or working towards CTC accounts include Mathis and Mozer (1996), Cotterill
(1998), Haikonen (2003), Holland (2003), Aleksander (2005), Sloman (2005), Cleermans (2005), Rolls
(2007), Ballard (2010), Stuart (2010) and Chella and Manzotti (2011). Later, I will argue that the
problems infecting TCS apply, in a more general form, to all CTCs.
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4. Critique of Chalmers’ Thesis of Computational Sufficiency
Chalmers’ TCS is complex and subject to varied objections.8 To keep
discussion manageable, I will restrict my objections to those concerning a
fundamental tension that arises out of the deployment of the concept ACO. As I’ll
explain, Chalmers’ account faces the burden of either showing how abstract
descriptions can generate real semantic properties or showing that silicon-based
systems (SBSs) implementations can have all the kinds of concrete mechanisms
whose activities are causally efficacious in the generation of human consciousness.
As I’ll show, given this dilemma, and the best scientific evidence about the
realization conditions of consciousness, the TCS proves false, vacuous or questionbegging.
Obviously, ACO depends upon the concepts of abstraction, causation and
organization. Chalmers’ basic idea is that there is a basal level of causation (in the
brain) that generates consciousness. However, if mental properties are
“organizationally invariant,” as he argues, it is not necessary to generate this causal
activity in the exact medium-dependent manner it occurs in us; rather, it is only
necessary to instantiate a computation whose states and transitions have a structure
that is isomorphic to the transitions of the actual causal activity. Before looking in
more depth at the proposal, it will be helpful to consider the general idea in play.
What is interesting about this thesis is that it might seem to assume that an abstract
representation of causal organization can be productive.
But is this putative assumption warranted? It is unlikely. Take a blueprint of
a watch, faucet or computer. What causal powers do such blueprints possess?
Though they may be said to possess certain dispositional powers (if utilized by an
engineer, perhaps), they are causally inert on their own. However, they are most
definitely ACOs. Perhaps abstract specifications of causal organizations are, as a
genus, causally impotent. Similarly, I can lecture (with diagrams, mathematics and
movies, no less) all day about the causal forces in solids that permit them to suspend
objects (a drink, say), but these have yet to keep my coffee from falling to the floor.
This is of course because descriptions qua descriptions – even when accurate
formalisms of real causal properties – never possess the actual causal powers of such
properties. Why would we expect consciousness to be any different?
8

There is not room to mention, let alone discuss, all the objections to aspects of the TCS. Certainly,
David Chalmers has done the best job of cataloging replies (see his very helpful “Responses to articles
on my work”). Here, I will make only a few points. Generally speaking, a number of writers have
taken issue with Chalmers’ ambition for an account of computation. Perhaps the most well-known
objection comes from John Searle, who criticized computational accounts of the mind for trying to get
semantic water from a syntactic well. Roughly speaking, Searle’s “intrinsic intentionality” objection is
that computations are individuated non-semantically (e.g., syntactically), and, given that human
consciousness is self-evidently semantic, computations cannot instantiate human consciousness
(Searle, 1980). This objection dovetails with discussion below. Other objections have been leveled
against Chalmers’ principle of organizational invariance (e.g., Seager, 1995; Pelczar, 2008), which we
will cover below, and Chalmers’ DQA and related thought experiments (e.g., Van Heuveln et al.,
1998; Bostrom, 2006), which we will not discuss, since Chalmers himself admits that his thought
experiments are inconclusive at best (Chalmers, 1999).
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As we have already seen, one aspect of Chalmers’ reply is his DQA thought
experiment. Although ingenious, its legitimacy depends on the assumption that a
silicon chip can instantiate the relevant causal powers of a neuron, which, however,
just begs the question (against a type-physicalist characterization of consciousness,
e.g.).
Tellingly, the difficulty reconciling the concepts “abstract” and “causal
organization” can be clearly seen in Chalmers’ own attempts to deploy the synonym
concept “organizational invariance.” The TCS depends on the premise that mental
properties are organizationally invariant. As we saw above, organizational invariance
obtains insofar as the physical deformation of a system, or system part, doesn’t affect
its functional role; that is, organizational invariance is a property of systems
characterized by ACO. This is because as long as the abstract causal organization is
unchanged (regardless of the concrete organization), the function of organizationally
invariant systems will remain unchanged.
Chalmers illustrates the concept of organizational invariance by contrast with
properties that are not organizationally invariant, such as flying and digesting. He
explains that flying is not organizationally invariant because “we can move an
airplane to the ground while preserving its causal topology, and it will no longer be
flying” and digestion is not organizationally invariant because “if we gradually
replace the parts involved in digestion with pieces of metal, while preserving causal
patterns, after a while it will no longer be an instance of digestion…” (Chalmers,
1994; p. 9)
However, contrary to Chalmers’ intent, the causal organizations that generate
flying and digestion are exactly what are not conserved in these examples.
Grounding the plane, in the first example, fails to replicate the requisite airflow
patterns whose causal organization underpins the property of flying, while replacing
digestive parts with metals in the second case fails to replicate the requisite enzyme
patterns whose causal organization underpins the property of digestion. Since
Chalmers’ examples fail, it is unclear what the idea amounts to. Perhaps Chalmers’
difficulties are to be expected given the nature of the complex concept he employs.
The key tension within ACO is that “abstraction” is the glossing over of
“causal” roles. Straightforwardly, if anything is a concrete, medium-dependent
property, real causation is; and if anything is a medium-independent property,
abstraction is. Real causation involves the transformation of real forces, while
abstractions do not. Thus, the causal properties of real forces are medium-dependent.
Consider: the same force F (a bullet of mass M traveling at acceleration A, say) plays
much different causal roles within different media (gas vs. water vs. glass vs. steel).
Conversely, abstract properties are medium-independent because the vehicles utilized
are irrelevant to their causal role. For example, whether a number is written, spoken
or simply thought (or otherwise) does not affect its relevant (mathematical) role.
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So, what are common examples of ACOs? Blueprints, models, maps, and
simulations. Now, I am not arguing that various scientists and philosophers haven’t
made good use of blueprints, models, maps and simulations (and therefore the
concept of ACO). Obviously they have. But the uses are descriptive. No one gets
wet from a faucet blueprint, a model of a storm front, or a map of the Great Lakes.
Because ACOs are syntactic in nature, the properties of ACOs (unlike the properties
of the entities they represent) are medium-independent, instantiation-independent.
ACOs lack the intrinsic powers of the properties they formalize.
Accordingly, it is inappropriate to apply ACO to the concrete phenomenon of
consciousness because it makes no sense to hold something simultaneously mediumdependent (concrete) and medium-independent (abstract) in respect of the same
property. While in the case of blueprints and maps, ACO may be an adequate
characterization, in the case of real artifacts and terrain, real implementation details
matter – abstract characterizations fail to instantiate the relevant features precisely
because they are abstractions. In other words, you can’t eat causal cake with an
abstract fork.
Above, I claimed that Chalmers faces a dilemma. It is this. There are two
aspects to Chalmers’ account: the computational formalism, which is a syntactic
description of causal state-transitions, on the one hand, and an implementation
requirement, on the other. Chalmers accepts that a theory of mental properties must
account for semantic properties. Thus, he must explain how either the computational
formalism or the implementation properties can account for such semantics.
Chalmers clearly rejects the first option, stating “syntax may not be enough
for semantics…” (ibid.; p. 13). He agrees that abstract entities (such as
algorithms/programs) are insufficient to generate real causal powers, let alone
cognition or semantics. In more detail he writes, “It is the program that is syntactic; it
is the implementation that has semantic content….syntax may not be enough for
semantics, but the right kind of causation is.” (ibid. Italics added.) Thus, he accepts
the second horn. In order to account for the semantics of consciousness, he posits
that they are derived from “real physical causation” implementation properties (ibid.).
However, this invites two new problems. First, if the “real physical
causation” implementation details are the crucial ones for cognition, semantics and
consciousness (ibid.), then a type-physicalist account becomes, to some degree,
preferable, because the essential causal work is being done by physical properties. To
salvage a computational approach to consciousness, an advocate might hold that
while physical tokening is necessary, it is the causal organization as given by the
computational formalism that gives shape, so to speak, to the mental properties.
However, it is unclear that this is different than (i.e., not extensionally equivalent to)
garden-variety type-physicalism. Any type-physicalist approach will hold that it is
both the physical properties and their organizational relations that matter (Scheutz,

7

2001). If this is right, calling such an approach “computational” begins to sound
vacuous.9
The second problem is that locating the semantics in causally real
implementation properties has the consequence that physical implementation
asymmetries can generate semantic asymmetries, which can preclude multiple
realizability. This follows from the simple reason that not any substrate can
implement any function. No amount of CO2 or toilet tissue can implement a
submarine or a quantum computer, e.g. In general, the more complex the function in
question, the more complex the substrate needed for its implementation. Arguably,
humans are categorically more complex than any thermodynamically inert SBS can
be, given the complexity of the hierarchical nesting of thermodynamic work cycles
concurrently causally efficacious in humans (cf. Kauffman, 2002; Collier, 2008).
Accordingly, if the functions constitutive of consciousness are complex enough, then
silicon-based systems will not possess enough structural degrees of freedom to
implement the relevant properties.
Below, I will argue that this is exactly the case. However, even if my
demonstration were deemed inconclusive, Chalmers’ argument remains critically
question-begging. His assertion that mental properties can be captured by the
implementation of their abstract causal properties simply begs the question against
those who would assert that consciousness is a medium-dependent phenomenon, not
realizable in any abstract process (e.g., Block, 1978; Searle, 2004; Hill, 2009;
McLaughlin, 2010; Polger, 2011). Since it is quite unclear both what the causal
organization of mental properties as instantiated in humans is, on the one hand, and
whether other systems can implement our causal organization, on the other (cf. Kary
and Mahner, 2002), this seems a bit gratuitous on his part.10 More specifically,
Chalmers would seem to beg the question against anyone who holds that “the causal
structure of a physical system (i.e., its causal complexity) is determined by its various
physical states and their causal relations among each other…[because] then
computation, and as a consequence functionalist descriptions, will not be able to
cover and capture all aspects of the causal structure.” (Scheutz, 2001; p. 563)
As we have seen, the TCS faces multiple objections. First, if the TCS is taken
to suggest that abstract formalisms can generate concrete phenomena, then it is
simply false. To escape from this, Chalmers holds that implementation properties are
necessary for realizing mental properties, as implementation properties, being
physical properties themselves, generate real physical causality, and so can account
for the semantics of mental properties. This, though, has two sequelae. One, because
the critical role is played by physical properties, it appears the theoretical uses are
9

I am indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting the possibility of pressing Chalmers on this
point.
10
This is important because, pace Shoemaker (2007), human consciousness serves as the necessary
indexicalization of our concepts of consciousness/qualia/phenomenology (McLaughlin, 2003). The
key point is that if we do not semantically ground phenomenology and qualia in/by human
consciousness, we have no way of recognizing the truth value of our concepts (i.e., properly
employing them).
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readily available to type-physicalist approaches. On this reading, the TCS is a
somewhat vacuous account of computation, as all physicalist approaches would
thereby become computational. The second result is that because implementation
properties are physical properties, physical differences become critical in the
determination of mental properties. The TCS, on this reading, is at least questionbegging, and, given the evidence discussed in § 6, below, likely false.
5. Replies and Counters
How might would-be defenders of the TCS reply to the objections in § 4?
There are multiple considerations.
First, it might be objected that my critique of ACO is misplaced given that
because “causal relations” are what Functionalists take to be medium-independent
(i.e., abstract), there is no tension within ACO. This is tangential to my point,
however. Certainly, “causal relations,” as typically adverted to in the literature,
denote causal pattern-descriptions (without the instantiated forces), and hence are
abstract. But causal relations, qua abstract, formal descriptions, have no
instantiation-dependent properties whatsoever. To avoid the fallacy of reification,
one must hold that causal relations need to be implemented to instantiate “real”
properties. Thus, what I take to be in tension are the concepts “abstract,” on the one
hand, and, “causation,” on the other, within the context of implementation. As they
say, you can’t have your cake and eat it too.
Second, a more substantive objection might be the following: It seems open to
a defender of the TCS to say that, very obviously, the TCS can account for both the
abstract (medium-independent) and concrete (medium-dependent) aspects of mental
properties: the implementation generates the medium-dependent properties, while the
ACO generates the medium-independent properties. Accordingly, both the syntax
and semantics are explained, and all objections countered.
However initially attractive, adverting to the MDPs of an implementation as
critical features of a TCS account invites the rejoinders encountered above. As we
saw, not only is it vacuous, or at least trivial, to call an approach that relies essentially
on the physical properties of systems “computational,” but physical differences in
implementation substrates, on this view, can be expected to generate semantic
differences in certain contexts, or to preclude certain systems from implementing
computations tout court. This is because MDPs are not multiply realizable in a
holistic sense. So, different implementation substrates will have, and lack, different
MDPs. Chalmers himself is very clear that “for any given complex [computation],
very few physical systems will have the causal organization required to implement it”
(1996; p. 319). It is not at odds with this latter point, for instance, to claim that, for
“mechanical” reasons, the set of non-human implementations of human
consciousness is zero, as I will argue in § 6.

9

But just which MDPs are necessary to generate the requisite mental states?
And what is the relationship between implementation properties and phenomenal
properties?
One view – call it the thin theory of implementation – is that implementation
details as such are tangential to phenomenology. On this view, what is important is
that there is a physical substrate – providing some real causality – of a computational
process. Other than the simple requirement of having enough parts to represent the
informational states of the computation, what physical mechanisms operate between
elements is tangential to phenomenology. Chalmers’ position on the Chinese Room
(1996; chapter 9) and elsewhere (e.g., 1994; p. 5) suggests this reading. The idea is
that no matter what the actual causal commerce between informational
elements/symbols (slips of paper, cans and string, etc.), the fact of causal interaction
simpliciter provides all the semantic grounding necessary. On this view,
implementations need not realize most of the MDPs of the original system; rather, the
fact that there is an implementation substrate at all provides all the MDPs necessary.
The problem here is bald implausibility. Two illustrations should suffice to
make the point. First, imagine a huge network of slips of paper tied to each other in a
fashion isomorphic to the causal commerce of a neural network whose instantiation in
us generates consciousness. Imagine that this network of string and paper slips is
spread out over a plateau 1000 km2. If a great wind blows over this plain, we can
imagine that the slips of paper will change “states” depending on both the network of
connections and the (input) energy from the wind (cf. Chalmers’ (1996; Chapter 9)
discussion of the Chinese Room thought experiment). Now, such a network is a
concrete implementation of the ACO of a system whose activity generates
consciousness. Just as neural states affect one another, the slips of paper are so
connected to each other (by the strings) that the activity in each paper partially
determines the activity of others. We can picture this grand network of strings and
little slips of paper spread out over a massive plateau, rustling in the breeze. So…is
the system of strings and paper slips conscious?
Chalmers very bravely claims “yes.” To his way of thinking, the slips of
paper purportedly capture the ACO of the real neural network that generates
consciousness, and the strings and papers generate the real physical causality
necessary for semantic content. But, given that his argument for why ACO should
generate phenomenology (his DQA, above) begged the question, there doesn’t seem
to be any good reason to think a vast field of strings and paper slips should qualify as
a conscious entity. And there seem to be a number of obvious reasons that it
shouldn’t. One, the strings and paper fail to instantiate a unified substrate; the
material collective of strings and paper is quite ad hoc and fails to resemble a natural
kind, which minds and consciousness reasonably are. Two, the system has no
intrinsic dynamics. While it is true that the system implements a pattern of rule
transitions, as governed by string arrangements between papers, it has no intrinsic
movement of its own. It is essentially inert, and, as Searle argues, has no “intrinsic
intentionality” (Searle, 2004). Three, admitting that such a “system” is conscious
10

would imply that minds are either omnipresent in any causally dense region of the
universe, if the states are observer-independent, or grossly underdetermined, as the
ascription of causal relations and symbols is observer-dependent. But if any one posit
is certain for each of us, it is that our being conscious is independent of any else’s
observation of us. This is certainly not a welcome result for those who take
consciousness seriously. These are not reasonable conclusions.
Secondly, compare a huge abacus and a supercomputer. Both can serve to
implement computations. If mental states can be realized by variously implemented
computational formalisms, then each system, given enough time, should be able to
instantiate the same mental state. Experience, though, is not atomic; experience is
temporally structured (Blackmore, 2011). But in what sense could these two systems
realize the same temporally-structured phenomenology if the experience were
dependent on contingent and transiently-available environmental stimuli, as happens,
say, when playing music in an ensemble, coordinating in-battle military maneuvers or
talking one’s way out of a speeding ticket?
Of course, a supercomputer will process a given computational sequence
orders of magnitude faster than much simpler machines, such as abaci. Accordingly,
the processes will quickly fall out of step relative to any varying
environment/feedback process. How can they realize the same experiences when the
temporal dynamics of their implementations (such as their temporal sensitivities to
input) are so different? More generally, given that temporal and information-density
dynamics are defining features of, arguably all, mental states, in what sense could
implementation substrates with vastly different processing capacities generate
equivalent experiences? Examples will sharpen the picture. Whereas the three
musical notes A – C – E, if they are presented quickly enough, can generate the
expectation of a return to A, or simply an appreciation of the A-minor chord, this will
not happen at slower sampling/presentation rates. Similarly, the phenomenology of
watching films is obliterated if the still images occur too slowly. The general reason
is that, in these and other cases involving perception and perceptual illusion, there are
temporal dynamics that must obtain in order to generate key gestalt effects. Without
such temporal dynamics, the relevant phenomenology is absent.
Thus, the problem for a proponent of a thin theory of implementation is that
“processing speed,” “energy throughput,” and “resource efficiency” are key
constituents of causal individuation: the informational, energetic, and resource
efficiency capacities of a system critically inform its causal topology (cf. Eliasmith,
2002). A thin theory of implementation cannot recognize these essential differences,
and thus implies that adult human consciousness can be instantiated in a system of
strings and paper slips. Accordingly, in the context of consciousness, a thin theory of
implementation seems to have consequences far too unbelievable and unmotivated to
allow us to take it seriously.
One remedy is to take a stronger view of implementation. According to a
thick theory of implementation, implementation details are directly relevant to the
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realization of phenomenology. On this view, implementing structures must have as
many functional degrees of freedom per unit time as the system being represented,
which requires implementation substrates have a sufficient number of structural
degrees of freedom. The following quote from Chalmers might be taken to suggest
such a view: “For each neuron, there will be a memory location that represents the
neuron, and each of these locations will be physically realized in a voltage at some
physical location. It is the causal patterns among these circuits, just as it is the causal
patterns among the neurons in the brain, that are responsible for any conscious
experience that arises” (Chalmers, 1996; p. 321; Italics added). Among other things,
this passage seems to imply that real physical implementation properties generate
analogous phenomenological properties (cf. Chalmers’ (1996) principles of coherence
and double aspect theory), that potential implementation substrates have mediumdependent limitations, and that there are strong constraints on what materials can
implement a given function, as determined by the design and functioning of the
original system whose behaviors are being represented/mimicked. On this, much
more plausible, view, the Chinese Room, the strings and papers mentioned above, and
many other ad hoc arrangements will not be conscious in virtue of the fact that the
implementation substrates will fail to generate the necessary MDPs. Such MDPs
might include, but are not limited to, electrodynamical circuit properties,
implementation substrate unity properties, or processing and resource capacity
properties, e.g.
The problem for the CTC advocate is that this cuts against her position, too. It
can motivate the conclusion that no silicon-based system can generate human-like
experiential states, because, if we say that the physical differences between these
systems’ implementations (which subvene differences in functional degrees of
freedom through differences in processing speed, power, and vehicles) can ground
mental state differences, then we are forced to hold that physical differences between
SBS and humans can ground essential mental differences. As we’ll see below, there
are excellent reasons to think that this is, in fact, the case. Perhaps the simplest
argument is the following. Adult human systems are categorically more complex
than SBSs. It is reasonable that our consciousness is generated by the most complex
class of functions we instantiate. Accordingly, SBSs may be debarred from realizing
human consciousness, for the same reason that an adding machine cannot reproduce
the functions achievable on a supercomputer in the same amount of time with the
same amount of resources.
The upshot of the present analysis is the following. On the one hand, since
semantic and phenomenological properties depend on informational processing
functions that require causal underpinning, it is implausible that systems with vastly
different causal capacities per unit time, sharing no structural commonalities, can
generate identical semantic and phenomenological properties. Hence, the thin theory
of implementation appears infeasible. On the other hand, given a thick theory of
implementation, it becomes questionable whether the specific causal underpinnings of
human-like consciousness can be multiply realized. We will examine this directly in
the next section. For now, the general problem for CTCs is that it is unclear how the
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real physical causation, which provides the essential semantics, can be assumed to be
sufficient to multiply realize properties in systems that are quite obviously
asymmetric in respect of not just specific MDPs, but also the number of degrees of
freedom instantiated (also an MDP). Assuming that SBSs can generate the requisite
causal, and hence semantic properties, is an article of faith that type-physicalists can
justifiably argue either, at best, begs the question, or, given the empirical conditions
under which awareness is generated (below), is false.
Third, it might be objected that my arguments are orthogonal to Chalmers’
key commitments. He claims that implementation properties subvening
computational formalisms (specifying causal organization changes) suffice for
mentality. He does not say either 1.) how the TCS comports with physicalist
approaches as such, or 2.) whether his account portends practical success in
generating “artificial consciousness.” I am sympathetic to these points, especially the
second. Chalmers is a very astute and careful thinker, and has guarded himself well.
Perhaps the letter of his message (notwithstanding the spirit) precludes the charge of
false promises. Since there is no room to discuss the subtleties of his metaphysical
position re: consciousness, it must to suffice to say that granting Chalmers the
abovementioned points is tangential to my concerns in this paper. Either his account
is a physicalist theory in disguise, in which case it is logically viable but empirically
empty vis-à-vis the class of SBSs, or it is legitimately computational, in which case it
is false.
Lastly, it might be argued that Chalmers’ CC is immune to the objections I
have offered, either because (i) I have given an incorrect account of CC, and thus my
critique does not apply, or (ii) CC, in virtue of stipulated causal sensitivities, can
handle medium-dependent properties. Perhaps, e.g., “electrophysiological
properties…are just the sorts of causal relations that, Chalmers argues, his conception
of computation can handle…”11 These objections can best be met by introducing and
explaining the central thesis of this paper.
6. The General Critique of Computational Theories of Consciousness
The foregoing discussion of Chalmers’ concept of ACO involves various
facets of the tension involved in harmonizing the abstract with the concrete. This can
be reformulated as a general problem applicable to all CTCs: the inherent gap
between medium-independent properties and medium-dependent properties. The
general argument against CTCs can be formulated straightforwardly.
(P1*) Computation is medium-independent.
(P2*) Consciousness is medium-dependent.
(P3*) Nothing that is medium-independent suffices for the instantiation of something
that is medium-dependent.
11

Thanks to an anonymous referee for requesting clarification here.
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(C1*) No CTC can be true.
Let us look at each step of the argument.
(P1*) P1* asserts that computations are individuated independently of the
physical media in which (a particular instance of) implementation occurs. Essentially
computational entities, like algorithms and software programs, are mediumindependent in that their essential specification is abstract/formal, and does not
include specific implementation details.12 In other words, since there are many
physically asymmetrical ways to formally replicate algorithmic descriptions, there are
many physically distinct ways to implement a given computation, hence the de facto
multiple realizability of computation.
But what is it that is to be implemented in a medium-independent manner?
The nuts and bolts of computation, so to speak, are state-transitional sequences that
are rule-following (Egan, 1995). State-transitional structure is implied by the ChurchTuring thesis, which holds that anything effectively computable can be computed by
(and hence is formally equivalent to) a Turing machine (Copeland, 2002). Since
Turing machines have state-transitional structures, it follows that computational
systems will have state-transitional structures (or their formal equivalent) as well.
And rule-following functionality is implied by recursion theory, and is required to
permit input-output relation preservation. If the foregoing is correct, then
computations are fundamentally individuated by three variables: mediumindependence, state-transitional structure, and rule-following functionality. Call this
the Minimal Theory of Computational Individuation.13
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More accurately, computational implementation involves only one medium-dependent (logical)
constraint: the medium must have enough degrees of freedom to encode the relevant computational
descriptions. This has been correctly noted by Piccinini and Scarantino (2011), and is implied in
Chalmers (1996; Chapter 9). The importance of this, as we’ll see below, follows from the fact that
different media have different implementation limitations.
13
An interesting ongoing debate is whether the rule-following function is necessarily semantic (i.e.,
whether computations have semantic individuation conditions). “Traditional” approaches have
assumed so (e.g., Shagrir, 2006; Fodor, 2008; Sprevak, 2010): they turn on considerations such as,
“Without some semantic constraint, how can we know if transitions are rule-following?” “In what
sense can we meaningfully call something a “rule” unless we have a clear understanding of what
makes it so?” Further support for this view comes from the fact that computation is useful only insofar
as it is representational/semantic. Conversely, non-semantic accounts hold that representation is
unnecessary to the concept of rule-following as such (cf. Egan, 1995; Piccinini, 2010b). A syntactic
rule, it is argued, still suffices as a rule. These non-semantic accounts hold that the most general
account of computational individuation should not advert to representational contents; the nature of the
rules and the potential semantic values of states are further matters whose details individuate specific
types and tokens of computation, but not computational processes simpliciter. One unsolved problem
for non-semantic accounts is how to usefully unpack the notion of syntactic rules (ibid.). Is there a
viable hybrid account? Obviously, there is no room for a discussion, but perhaps we can distinguish
metaphysical and epistemic notions of computation. Metaphysically speaking, computations might be
non-semantic, but, given the requirement of cognitive access, we must individuate usable computations
semantically. The idea is that if there are non-semantic “syntactic” rules, they are epistemically
beyond our ken, and cannot be classified as computations by us, in any case.
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Whether the Minimal Theory is correct, however, is tangential to the truth of
P1*. Computations, as abstractly formalized functional descriptions, are not mediumdependent entities. Neither Chalmers, nor any computationalist, denies that. As long
as a state-transitional rule-following sequence (of formal description X (mirroring the
causal organization of Y, e.g.)) is implemented in a medium-independent manner, a
computation (X(Y)) has occurred. It should be clear that Chalmers’ CC, e.g., is a
variant of this general account of computational individuation, thus answering
objection (i) in § 5 above.14 P1*, moreover, is consonant with Chalmers’ claim that
mental properties are organizationally invariant; thus, there is nothing contentious
about P1* from a defender of TCS/CTC’s point of view.
(P2*) P2* asserts that consciousness is a medium-dependent property. P2
obviously begs the question against defenders of the CTC, and therefore requires
independent support. I will offer two arguments, one analytical in nature (A) and the
other empirical (B).15
(A) The analytical argument for the medium-dependence of consciousness
comes from an analysis of the nature of experience itself. The basic idea is that
consciousness – conscious experience – displays a fundamental unity or holism (see
Brook and Raymont (2010) for an overview), which requires us to treat it as
fundamentally concrete in nature.
One way to argue is as follows. Conscious experience is a self-evident
“given.” Even, a la Descartes, if some representational contents of experience are
illusory, one cannot doubt one’s having an experience simpliciter. Experience,
moreover, requires an “experiencer”: a subject. Subjecthood, furthermore, is
individuated by phenomenal holism (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003; Alter, 2010;
Dainton, 2010), which is the instantiation of a metaphysically real “strong unity:” the
individuating condition of “objecthood” (Strawson, 2010). Thus, subjects of
experience – given the strong unity evident in phenomenal consciousness – are
objects: “metaphysically real concretely existing entit[ies]” (ibid.; p. 88).
Thus, the first part of the analytic argument establishes the corollary theses
that (1) consciousness is a metaphysically real, concrete phenomenon and that (2)
conscious subjects, given phenomenal holism, are objects. But in virtue of what is
something (1) real/concrete and (2) an object? One obvious answer is that something
is “real” (i.e., an object) in virtue of its ability to have causal impact on the world (cf.
14

Remember, for Chalmers, if “the formal state-transitional structure of the computation mirrors the
causal state-transitional structure of the physical system,” then a causally-individuated computation has
occurred (Chalmers, 1994; p. 4).
15
One noteworthy argument I will not directly deploy is how a computational theory could account for
emotional experience, given that emotions are probably the most obvious candidates for MDPs. Prima
facie, this is a considerable problem for computational theories, considering the qualitative
concreteness of emotions and their neurochemical (i.e., plausibly type-physicalist) realization.
However, there simply isn’t space to open up such a complex and vexing topic. See Charland (1995),
Sizer (2000), Nussbaum (2003) and Stuart (2010) for a balanced overview of the issue.
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Collier, 2008). Since causal impact obtains in virtue of instantiation-dependent
properties (of a system), objects are individuated by their instantiation-dependent
properties (IDPs).
What, then, are IDPs? Plausibly, IDPs are constitutive physical properties of
systems/objects/processes. Internalist/narrow-content IDPs might be contrasted with
externalist/broad-content CDIPs (context-dependent instantiation properties), in that
the latter are dispositional properties that depend on environmental contingencies for
their realization. But what can we say of the class comprised by IDPs and CDIPs?
Given that both classes of properties depend upon the exact nature of actual and
potential physical interactions, it seems correct to say that IDPs and CDIPs are
subsets of the larger class, MDPs. If so, then IDPs imply MDPs, and the analytic
argument for P2* is thus: since concrete entities are concrete in virtue of their MDPs,
and consciousness is self-evidently concrete, we can conclude that consciousness is a
medium-dependent phenomenon.
Now, Strawson characterizes functions as “concretely existing unities” (ibid.;
p. 89), and so, returning to our paradigm case, Chalmers’ ACO would count as
concrete by Strawson’s own lights. Hence, Strawson’s analysis provides no problem
for the TCS or CTCs in general. But I think Strawson is wrong here. Specifically, I
think Strawson makes the same mistake Chalmers does – a certain metaphysical
gratuity with abstract “objects” (a la Plato). Functions may be concrete descriptions,
but that is a far cry from amounting to concrete instantiations in respect of the same
properties. Again, reification fallacies loom.
Nevertheless, the analytic argument given here does not seem to be able to
deliver the goods. There are at least two central objections to the analytical argument
as presented. One, it can be accused of begging the question in multiple respects;
first, in assuming consciousness to be causally efficacious in order to derive that
consciousness entails IDPs, and, second, then deducing that phenomenal holism
entails medium-dependence. This leads to the second problem, which is that, even if
the outlines of a valid argument are in view, it is presented far too quickly. The
discussion skates over a number of contentious metaphysical and epistemological
assumptions, whose utilization requires stronger defense. Given that the empirical
argument (B) is much clearer, we will shortly turn to it in lieu of trying to navigate
these murkier waters.
Before moving on, however, I think that the analytical argument does bring up
an interesting challenge for CTCs. Any complete theory of the mental must be able
to explain the phenomenological holism each of us, as subjects, experiences. If
computations generate mental states, then coherence between mental states would
seem to require coherence between computations. But by what mechanism will all
these computations cohere? In other words, by what resources can a CTC account for
the meta-coherence that must obtain among computations to instantiate phenomenal
holism?
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Say that computations are mutually coherent if it is possible to simultaneously
implement them in the same spatiotemporal system. Two routes of response seem
open to the defender of a CTC. One route is to argue that there is only one
computation with mental properties. There would of course be no possible conflict
between mental states in such a case, as there would only be one complex
computation in question. However, there are no reasons to think such a case is
possible, let alone plausible, and, given the self-evident diversity of mental contents
within conscious experience, assuming that there is only a single computation might
seem both unlikely and at odds with the practices of typical defenders of the
computational theory of mind (cf. Fodor, 2008; and see Horst (2009) for an
overview).
The other option for a defender of a CTC is to argue that the set of
simultaneously implemented “mental” computations will be mutually physically
coherent. The question is how to explain, in a non ad-hoc manner, how a theory of
computation can generate the requisite simultaneous implementability that must
obtain between vast numbers of physically-realized computations. In the brain, the
nested, hierarchical structure – evolutionarily “designed” over millions of years –
assures a tendency towards massive mutual coherence (Simon, 1973; Werner, 2010).
In silicon-based systems (SBSs), such massive mutual coherence must be designed
top-down. Given the complexity of human consciousness, it is a fair question
whether SBSs displaying the requisite computational complexity to realize humanlike consciousness can be built.
Of course, defenders of CTCs seem free to respond that the foregoing
concerns are practical ones, and are therefore orthogonal to their theoretical claims.
This is a fair reply. And, insofar as such considerations about physical
implementation constraints are potentially decisive, they will reappear in the context
of the empirical argument. Let us turn to it.
(B) The empirical argument for P2 involves the insight that, epistemically
speaking, it is an a posteriori matter what physical details are functionally relevant to
the generation of consciousness (Levin, 2008; Hill, 2009; McLaughlin, 2010;
Weisberg, forthcoming). I want to examine two special structural properties whose
instantiation arguably realizes/subvenes consciousness: our electrodynamical (B1)
and our fractal (B2) nature.
(B1) In examining the correlates of consciousness, one fact is uncontested:
consciousness varies in accordance with electroneurodynamical properties. But
which electroneurodynamical aspects are irrelevant to the generation of
consciousness is unknown. Historically speaking, part of the motivation for positing
that the mind can be understood computationally is that neurons function, in part, in a
discrete (all-or-none firing) fashion, analogous to the digital computation
characteristic of typical computers (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943). But it is an open
question whether the brain generates mental states by such discrete operations alone.
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It has long been established that the electrical fields in the brain affect neural
firing, which is unsurprising as electrical fields move electrically-sensitive ions
(whose movement through neural membranes realizes both neural spikes and graded
potentials) (Pockett, 2000). Since neural firing, by inference to the best explanation,
realizes (or at least subvenes) consciousness in humans, it is natural to speculate that
the electrodynamical field generated in the brain generates consciousness-changing
causal effects (ibid.; John, 2001; McFadden, 2002; Frolich and McCormick, 2010).16
Key evidence comes from the use of repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, in
which the application of electromagnetic fields has been shown to directly change
conscious experience (Overgaard et al., 2004; Babiloni et al., 2007). If this is correct,
then consciousness (at least partially) depends on the instantiated electrodynamical
field properties (EFPs) of the brain (cf. Fingelkurts et al., 2010). It is in this sense, as
I will argue, that consciousness is inherently medium-dependent. EFPs are crucially
inseparable from the media they constitute because EFPs have holistic/global
properties, such as nonlocality (Belot, 1998; Frisch, 2002) and unified physical
continuity (Lipkind, 2005). Given this, EFPs are necessarily MDPs. Thus, if
consciousness depends upon EFPs, as neuroscience suggests, then consciousness
depends upon MDPs, and P2* is true.
What, though, are EFPs, and why should they be considered to be MDPs? In
a review of field properties, Michael Lipkind notes the following individuating
conditions of fields: physicality, causal nonlocality, continuity and sensitivity to
internal parameters (ibid.). These properties fall out of the fact that EFPs are
electrodynamic physical forces, containing energy and momentum, applicable to each
intra-field “point.” Electrodynamical fields thereby affect the behavior of electroresponsive “particles” within them, and are thus causally efficacious. Because fields
affect all points by a given quantity (at a particular time), they possess holistic/global
properties, like nonlocality and continuity (Belot, 1998; Frisch, 2002). Accordingly,
accounting for EFPs requires instantiating holistic/global causal properties. Given
that the individuating conditions for EFPs and computations are largely antithetical,
the worry for CTCs is how EFPs are to be realized in computational processes.
There are two aspects of computation to consider: their abstract/formal
characterization and their implementation conditions. The problem, as we’ve seen, is
this: on the one hand, it is unclear how real field causality can be captured abstractly,
in a medium-independent state transitional sequence. An abstract formalism is not
the kind of entity that generates real causal properties. And, on the other hand,
adverting to implementation properties doesn’t seem to help either: If computational
systems are required to implement EFP-subvening structures, then physical
differences between SBSs and humans make such implementation highly implausible.
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Such a conclusion is unsurprising since living systems depend on electrodynamical activity in
manifold ways and on multiple spatiotemporal scales (Adey, 1984; West, 2006). See, e.g., the
abstracts from the latest (2011) Electrodynamic Activity of Living Cells conference (online at
http://edalc11.ufe.cz/doku.php).
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It is a question of mechanical dynamics: whether it is possible to build SBSs
that can implement the relevant field properties required to realize the “real physical
causality” that generates the necessary semantic properties (at least partially)
constitutive of consciousness. The problem with implementing the kind of EFPs
generated in organic brains – the only structures whose capacity to realize
consciousness is undisputed – is that SBSs, as presently conceived, are designed in a
manner antithetical to that of natural systems. Specifically, SBSs are designed to
minimize EFPs, so as to maximize component independence and to minimize signal
noise, while the components of organic systems are inherently interdependent, given
that mutual functionality is a prerequisite for natural selection (cf. Simon, 1973;
West, 2006; Werner, 2010). More specifically, electrodynamics in organic systems
are generated in an aqueous environment that serves as a conduction-enhancing
substrate, while SBSs have no analogous field-ground (Giertz, 2010). This is
nowhere more true than it is in regards to the brain’s intrinsic electrodynamical field
and its local field potentials, which have been argued to be non-instantiable in SBSs
as currently conceived (Pockett, 2000).
The basic argument of (B1) can be easily summarized. As revealed by
empirical experiment, consciousness depends on EFPs. Field properties involve
holistic physical forces. Such properties are medium-dependent in that they
sensitively depend upon the exact media in which they occur. Given that
computations are medium-independent, such field properties could only be realized
by implementation properties. However, due to antithetical design differences, EFPrelevant physical differences preclude SBSs (as currently conceived) from realizing
human-like EFPs. Yet the hopes for CTCs are actually even worse, since there is
another consciousness-subvening feature that greatly deepens the difficulty here
discussed. It is this: organic systems are inherently fractal, while SBSs are inherently
Euclidian.
(B2) A profound difference between ourselves and any SBS is that, due to our
evolutionary design, we are intrinsically fractal, both structurally and functionally
(cf. Iannaccone and Khokha, 1996; West, 2006; Aguirre et al., 2009; Werner, 2010).17
SBSs are not.18 I will argue that this principal design asymmetry is decisive in
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We are fractal in many ways. A few structural examples (and see West et al. (1999)): we grow
through fractal self-subdivision (i.e,. cell division). Each proper part of us is self-similar (i.e, each cell
contains the same DNA). Larger structures in us are structurally fractal (lungs, circulatory system,
central nervous system (Werner, 2010), etc.). Lastly, our overall structure is a nested hierarchy, e.g.,
(body (organs (tissues (cells (DNA))))). For sensorimotor examples, see Kelso (1995) and West
(2006). For cognitive examples, see MacCormac and Stamenov (1996) and Werner (2010).
18
This is not to say that silicon-based systems cannot be designed with some fractal structure. In fact,
engineers have already created low-dimensional fractal antennae. The problem, for CTC advocates,
however, is that there is a profound and categorical complexity gulf between the fractal dimensionality
of organic and inorganic systems, on the one hand, and between organic, bottom-up processes and
inorganic, top-down ones (Collier, 2008). Simply put, these differences stem from the fact that
organic systems, by dint of their self-organizing nature, continually increase their fractal
dimensionality across many orders of magnitude as they grow. In the brain, for example, cognitive
development is underpinned by the fractal self-organization of neural networks (Sporns, 2011). SBSs
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refuting CTCs, for it betokens an unbridgeable implementation gulf, which implies an
unbridgeable semantic/intentional gap (which implies an unbridgeable
phenomenological gap).
The key fractal (F) argument is the following:
(FP1) Consciousness depends upon fractal functional properties (cf. MacCormac and
Stamenov, 1996; Gong and Leeuwen, 2002; West, 2006; Werner, 2010; Sporns,
2011).
(FP2) Fractal functional properties are generated by energy throughput within fractal
structures (Michelitsch et al., 2009).
(FL1) Consciousness depends upon energy throughput within fractal structures.
(FP3) Energy throughput within fractal structures is a MDP (ibid.).
(FC1) Consciousness depends on at least one MDP.19
Numerous studies have shown fractal functional properties in consciousness
data, suggesting that they are a dynamic correlate of consciousness (MacCormac and
Stamenov, 1996; Werner, 2010). Fractal functional properties include scale-invariant
power-law dynamics (such as statistical self-similarity across a wide variety of
scales), hierarchical nesting dynamics, chaotic bifurcation dynamics, and nonlocality
(Aguirre et al., 2009; Michelitsch et al., 2009).20
It has been mathematically demonstrated that fractal functional properties,
such as nonlocal coherence between system elements, are generated by energy
throughput within fractal structures (Michelitsch et al., 2009). Given this, realizing
such real fractal functional properties requires implementing real electrodynamicallysensitive fractal structures (cf. Bieberich, 2002).
A paradigmatic electrodynamically-sensitive fractal structure is that of the
human CNS (ibid., Werner, 2010). In the human CNS, with the proper energy
throughput – the electrodynamics of which are at least partially regulated by
neurochemical circuits (Rose, 2006) – consciousness arises. There is strong evidence
that human CNSs generate fractal functional properties in proportion to the
complexity of their structural fractal dimensionality (Honey et al., 2010; Sporns,

have no equivalent capacity for novel hardware complexification, and this underpins the gulf in
implementation properties that explain the failure of CTCs.
19
This suggests the following Fractal Neurodynamics Theorem: The degree of consciousness is given
by the fractal dimensionality of the transiently sustainable electrodynamical energy throughput.
20
These properties can be speculated to underlie numerous phenomena associated with consciousness,
such as the self-reflexivity and unity of consciousness, on the phenomenological side, and the
remarkable zero-lag synchronization (Pockett, 2000; John, 2001) among distant parts of the central
nervous system (CNS) that appears to generate conscious experience, on the functional side.
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2011).21 Accordingly, it appears reasonable to infer that the realization of
consciousness requires the generation of real highly complex fractal functional
properties (cf. Bieberich, 2002; Walling and Hicks, 2003; Werner, 2010).
However, given that SBSs are not constructed from self-similar iterative
processes on multiple scales (as occurs in organic systems through complex, selforganization processes), it is arguable that complex organic systems are of
categorically higher fractal dimensionality than SBSs.22 It is also plausible that the
highest electrodynamical fractal structures are those comprising parts of the CNS
(Walling and Hicks, 2003). Given these considerations, there are very good reasons
to believe that SBSs cannot instantiate the highest fractal functional properties of the
human CNS.23 Therefore, if adult human consciousness is generated by the highest
class of fractal functional properties of the human CNS (cf. Pocket, 2000; Bieberich,
2002; Werner, 2010), then CTCs will fail on account of there being no viable
implementation substrates that are complex enough (to realize electrodynamicallysensitive structural properties of sufficient fractal dimensionality).
The basic argument of (B2) can be easily summarized. As revealed by
empirical experiment, consciousness depends on fractal functional properties. As
shown by mathematical demonstration, fractal functional properties emerge from
fractal structural properties. Accordingly, computations would have to be
implemented with the same relevant fractal structure as obtain in humans to generate
the same consciousness-realizing fractal properties. However, while complex, nonequilibrium processes naturally generate fractal structures of variable complexity,
equilibrium artifacts, such as SBSs, do not. Thus, there is a categorical fractal
dimensionality asymmetry that grounds a fundamental implementation/realization
asymmetry. It is this asymmetry that invalidates CTCs.
In sum, as the arguments for (B) show, empirical evidence suggests that
consciousness depends on MDPs that cannot be implemented in SBSs. More
specifically, (B) argues that consciousness depends upon fractal and electrodynamical
field properties, both of which place severe medium-dependent constraints on the
realization of consciousness, constraints that can not be met in SBSs. Having derived
P2*, let us turn to P3*.
(P3*) P3* holds that entities characterized by MIPs can not instantiate entities
characterized by MDPs. This is a very intuitive premise. It holds, e.g., that math
equations explaining sound waves are not, themselves, audible – or that descriptions
of buoyancy do not confer buoyancy thereby.
21

Evidence shows that fractal dimensionality increases in healthy growth and declines in infirmity,
disease and old age (West, 2006).
22
Organic systems are those in which real fractal functionality derives from real fractal structural
properties changing over time. This distinction is important for separating causally real fractal systems
from causally-inert mathematical objects (e.g., Sierpinski gasket) or man-made 2D fractal antennae.
23
This is unsurprising given the antithetical (artificial vs. natural selection) design properties. A
categorical fractal dimensionality difference is expected given the self-organizing nature of organic,
but not inorganic, systems.
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The most important issue for our purposes is whether a fundamentally
medium-independent process like computation can realize medium-dependent
properties. There seem to be two possibilities. (1) On the one hand, it may be that
computational processes can only realize MIPs. (2) On the other hand, it may be that
computational processes can realize MDPs in virtue of their other properties. Prima
facie, it is unclear how rule-following functionality or state-transitional “structure”
could permit the realization of MDPs. This is perhaps most clearly appreciated in the
context of mathematics. Mathematical properties generally imply rule-following
functionality and state-transitional structure, but, on their own, fail to instantiate real
causal properties. Thus, such computational properties can not be expected to
generate MDPs. One cogent reply, though, is that computations can realize MDPs in
virtue of implementation properties. In fact, as we’ve seen, this is exactly how
Chalmers argues that computations can have semantic properties.
Obviously, option (1) is unattractive for computationalists, as it would
severely limit what computational processes can be expected to do. Certainly, option
(2) provides much more wiggle room. The problem with the second reply, however,
is that it gives up the ship to a type-physicalist characterization. This is because it
grants computations the power to realize MDPs only in virtue of the physical
properties of their implementations. Accordingly, if consciousness is mediumdependent (i.e., constituted by MDPs), computations will only be able to realize
consciousness in virtue of the physical properties of their implementations, which is
certainly not an abstract individuation condition.
(C1*) C1* asserts that no CTC can be true. The argument is straightforward.
Computation, as such, is medium-independent, because many structures can
implement the same state-transitional sequence. Consciousness, moreover, is
arguably medium-dependent, on account of the electrodynamical field and fractal
properties that generate it. Accordingly, if computational processes are to generate
consciousness, they must generate the requisite medium-dependent properties in
virtue of implementation properties. However, the specific structural properties
implicated in human consciousness do not appear to be potential substrates of nonbiological implementations. Therefore, the medium-independence individuation
condition of CTCs cannot be met, and no CTC can succeed.
7. General Argument Against CTCs: Objections and Replies
Several objections can be leveled against such a broad conclusion. Perhaps
most obviously, the evidence used herein might be disputed, or at least questioned.
However, there is nothing inherently contentious or surprising about the
empirical claims involved. Natural processes aggregate by fractal dynamics
(Iannaccone and Khokha, 1996; Aguirre et al., 2009, etc.), and we are natural
processes par excellence. Given that functions supervene on structures (Honey et al.,
2010), it is natural to reason that as the fractal dimensionality of a structure increases,
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so too does the functional complexity the structure is capable of subvening (Waller
and Hicks, 2003). Accordingly, it is no surprise that our mental lives should be made
possible by highly fractal central nervous system properties (Werner, 2010; Sporns,
2011). In addition, living organisms depend on electrodynamics for most biological
activities (Adey, 1984). Unquestionably, the brain is the predominant
electrodynamical organ. Hence, it is unsurprising that our mental lives would depend
on electrodynamical states, such as EFPs (Pockett, 2000). So, while one might
question the empirical claims, plausibility is in their favor.
A second question is that raised as (ii) in § 5 (above): Perhaps, e.g.,
“electrophysiological properties…are just the sorts of causal relations that…[a
CC]…can handle…” That is, why can’t a CTC account for MDPs in virtue of a
causal theory of individuation? Why can’t the causal effects of fractal and
electrodynamical organization be “written into” the computational description?
There are several relevant considerations.
As we’ve seen, for Chalmers, a viable computational account rests on
producing the “same pattern of causal interactions” (Chalmers, 1994; 1996; p. 248).
The short answer to the above question, then, is that the actual pattern of causal
interactions in neurons depends on their omni-electro-responsiveness. This means
that patterns of causation between neurons involve the continuous fluctuation of EM
fields in which they are embedded (Pockett, 2000; Rose, 2006). Not only are the ions
within and around neurons sensitive to (and move due to) electrical fields, the graded
potentials within changing neural membranes are near-continuously sensitive to
changes in the electrical properties of extracellular matrix (ibid.). The EM properties
of this space (and hence the causal organization of the neurons) are also largely
affected by glial cells, which keep the EM field at the edge of responsiveness by
absorbing and releasing neurochemicals (Fields, 2009). Thus, this extracellular space
provides a common causal influence that is not represented in the discrete modeling
of any given neuron. Accordingly, part of our functional organization is constituted
by field properties that cannot be reduced to the sum of discrete states of neurons.
These causally efficacious fields are (computationally) emergent properties.
Since the foregoing neurobiological explanation might be accused of begging
the question, let’s approach the question from a computational point of view,
returning to Chalmers’ paradigm theory to consider what he writes about the
implementation conditions for a combinatorial state automata (CSA), the key
computational system for the TCS: A “system implements a given CSA if there
exists…a vectorization of states of the system, and a mapping from elements of those
vectors onto corresponding elements of the vectors of the CSA, such that the statetransition relations are isomorphic in the obvious way.” (Chalmers, 1994; p. 5) In
general, the key problems with implementing nonlocal fractal and field properties are
that there is no way to capture such physically holistic properties in a system 1.)
whose essential syntax is in terms of system sub-states (i.e. parts), and 2.) which
changes in a local, discrete and sequential manner, as opposed to a nonlocal, global
and holistic one.
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But what about the possibility of writing a computation such that each state
change introduces changes in, potentially, all other variables? It might be argued that
this would properly recreate the “global” state effects argued to be essential.
A first, epistemic, difficulty that arises is “How do we know what are the
relevant physical states?” By what physical taxonomy might we properly carve up
our own structural underpinnings? A second, further, problem is “How do we know,
given the chaotic dynamics that are well-established aspects of our neurodynamics,
what the relevant causal transitions are?” It is unclear that such obstacles are
surmountable. For the sake of argument, though, let us imagine such difficulties can
be overcome.
A third, programming, problem awaits. How could we create programs that
contained the vast numbers of states that must be included? Mental states are often
contextually cued; accordingly, all the potential environments that might be
encountered would have to be programmed, along with all the appropriate, but
contingent, responses. Note that it is quite unclear how environments and their
dispositional architectures should be programmed. Additionally, these contingent
responses would have to be written in a non-transitive manner, such that the order of
experiences would be relevant to state determination. Again, the programming
burdens increase.
It is easy to underestimate the difficulty of the task implicated. Even a single
dendritic spine is the size of an amoeba, which contains approximately a million
chemicals in semi-ordered configurations (Rose, 2006). The activity of individual
dendrites influences graded potentials, which themselves influence action potentials,
which are widely assumed to be predominant, though not exclusive, mental causes.
There are over 100 billion neurons in the human CNS, some of which have thousands
of sites of active chemical transmission with upwards of thousands of other neurons.
The number of potential state combinations and permutations quickly become
mathematically intractable (NP-Hard) for the calculation of the diachronic
development of such a network. Now, even if such a program could be written, what
machine is powerful enough to store all the contingent states and effectively process
the program? Given the complexity of the causal organization of the CNS,
combinatorial explosion problems seem insurmountable.
Of course, if nonlocal processing is required to instantiate our mental states, as
Jerry Fodor (2008) suggests, then Chalmers’ discrete and discontinuous TCS would
fail on those grounds. But let us bracket this problem, granting, for the sake of
argument, that either Fodor is wrong in his speculation or that some remedy might be
found – if not one to which the TCS has access, then one that other CTCs might
utilize.
Bracketing all the aforementioned problems, might a CTC advocate claim that
nonlocal and global properties can be written into computational descriptions? It
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seems not. There still remains what we can call the semantic problem. In order to
avoid reification fallacies, computationalists must hold that computations need to be
implemented in order to generate real (non-abstract) properties. The implementation
properties generate the real physical causality that provides the semantic properties
necessary for realizing real mental states. But here we have the introduction of
physical properties. The necessary semantics are generated by real forces; moreover,
the semantic properties depend upon the relevant physical properties. But this means
that simply modeling, and not instantiating, certain physical properties (nonlocality,
holism) will fail to generate the necessary semantics, just as modeling a storm will
fail to generate rain. The point of the implementation requirements is that the
relevant properties must be instantiated, not merely described. This is why nonlocal
properties, as arise from field and fractal dynamics in the brain, cannot be merely
written into computational descriptions. They would thereby fail to have the
semantic properties that make them important in the first place.
A third question concerns the nature of the implementation dynamics
required. Would not a form of analog computation suffice to account for the
implementation properties required to realize consciousness?
Let us first note that this strategy is unavailable for Chalmers (1994), who
specifically stipulates a discrete and discontinuous account of computation (section
3.4). Chalmers argues that analog computation is unnecessary because continuous
and chaotic dynamics will wash out, at a basal enough level, as noise. Moreover,
since whatever turns out to be the basal functional level will be describable with a
fine-enough grain of analysis, such continuous and chaotic dynamics will fail to “add
anything new.” This strategy runs into the following problems. One, defining neuroactivity as “noise” must post-date, rather than precede, a theory of neurodynamics,
which is something we don’t yet have (cf. Werner, 2010; p. 14). It is a somewhat
empty gesture to turn an argument upon “neural noise” sans a theory of
neurodynamics. Two, assuming that complex and chaotic dynamics cannot “add
anything new” is a very ironic reply, given that epistemic emergence is a sine qua non
of complex dynamics in general. That is, the one prediction one can make about
complex systems (with a probability that rises in proportion to system complexity) is
unpredictability. And if you can be sure you can’t predict the behavior of a system, it
rings hollow to claim a priori that the system will not generate novel behaviors.
Lastly, and decisively, discrete and discontinuous computational processes cannot
realize nonlocal properties, as we’ve seen.
But what of analog CTCs? Can they achieve what digital CTCs cannot?
Analog computation can be defined as that which takes continuously varying, and not
discrete, variables as its inputs. Such inputs, however, are still manipulated in an
essentially medium-independent state-transitional rule-following manner. In order to
qualify as a computation, there must be unambiguous input-output transitions. This,
however, requires unambiguous input identification. Accordingly, the analog nature
of the input is partial and implementation-dependent (in that greater input specificity
requires more complex and resource-expensive hardware).
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Now, in restricting input, part of the causal organization is discarded.
However, for certain properties – archetypically, for MDPs – holistic causal
preservation is an individuating condition. Thus, for archetypal MDPs, such as
consciousness, analog computation fails to instantiate holistic causal organization.
Given these constraints, it can be seen that analog CTCs fare no better. Their
medium-independence causes them to suffer from the same problems as digital CTCs.
Lastly, it might be argued that novel engineering progress might permit the
generation of non-biological machines capable of consciousness. There are two main
considerations. First, novel machines might be of a heretofore unknown structure and
generate heretofore unknown functions. My arguments cannot be weighed against
this possibility; to do so would commit the fallacy of ignorance. Second, it might be
thought that novel SBSs are possible that might surmount the limitations I have
enumerated. However, I maintain that there are no good reasons to hold that nonbiological systems (systems without biological systems as proper parts) can generate
the requisite structural and functional properties. Why? Very simply: the antithetical
design principles by which living and non-living systems are generated imply
profound structural and functional asymmetries. As I have argued, the most relevant
asymmetries for the question of human-like consciousness are electrodynamical field
and fractal structural properties.
In sum, I have argued that defenders of CTCs face a dilemma. If they attempt
to eschew computational implementation, then, given the essentially MIP-nature of
computations, computations will fail to generate MDPs, which is problematic given
the strong reasons to think semantic content (a fortiori, consciousness) depends on
MDPs. This forces advocates of CTCs to claim that computations can generate
MDPs in virtue of implementation properties. This latter strategy, though, accedes
that MDPs obtain only in virtue of real physical causation. Given the empirical
evidence that fractal structure and electrodynamical fields are causally efficacious in
the generation of mental properties, the inability of silicon-based computational
systems to realize the fractal electrodynamical properties of organic brains, due to
fundamental design asymmetries between natural-evolutionary and artificial
processes, implies no CTC can be true.
8. CTCs and the HMSMRST
If the foregoing is correct, then no CTC can be correct. What, though, is the
relation of computational processes and silicon-based systems (SBSs)?
As denoted here, SBSs refer to artifact-machines comprised of silicon and
other non-living materials.24 Computers are the archetypal SBSs; certainly they are
24

A caveat. My argument is tangential to the possibilities of natural-artificial system hybrids (cyborgs,
etc.), which have natural systems as proper parts. My argument also only holds against presently
conceivable silicon-based systems. (I am agnostic about what might be possible with “high-powered”
quantum computers (which are presently of negligible computing power (8 qubits?) due to physical
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the most sophisticated SBSs known. Given the self-evident complexity of conscious
experience, it is reasonable to expect that only the most complex machines might
multiply realize (MR) it. Accordingly, computers have been the paradigm candidates
for subjects of artificial consciousness/experience.
As currently conceived, all of the most complex electrodynamical SBSs can
be classified as one type or another of computer (or computer-like system).
Tautologically, computers instantiate computations. As we have seen, computations
are insufficient for the instantiation of consciousness. Hence, computers are
insufficient for the instantiation of consciousness. Since there are no candidates for
complex SBSs that are not computers in one guise or another, it is reasonable to
generalize the arguments against computers to SBSs.
Thus, given the assumption that only complex SBSs could even potentially
MR human-like consciousness, and that computers comprise the class of the most
complex SBSs, the present argument suggests that SBSs cannot MR human mental
states. That is, the HMSMRST is false.
The general argument of this section is as follows:
(C1*) All CTCs are false (§ 6).
(P3*) The only plausible realization of the HMSMRST is via a CTC.
(C2*) There is no plausible realization of the HMSMRST.
(C3*) The HMSMRST is (almost certainly) false.
9. Conclusion
With the goal of shedding some light on the question of the nature of the
relationship between consciousness and computation, I assessed David J. Chalmers’
paradigm computational theory of consciousness, his thesis of computational
sufficiency, in which the capacity of computations to capture abstract causal
organization, paired with the organizational invariance of mental states, implies that
the right kind of computation is sufficient for possession of a (conscious) mind.
I argued that the TCS was undermined by a critically insufficient deployment
of the concept of abstract causal organization. The key problem was seen to be a
dilemma arising from the tension between the concepts of “abstraction” and
“causality.” It forces computational approaches to depend too heavily on
implementation properties, which are physical properties.

implementation limitations). I am not agnostic about whether such are possible: I wager the
implementation limitations to engineering computationally powerful quantum computers are decisive.)
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Generalizing this problem, I introduced a general argument against
computational approaches to consciousness based on the medium-independent nature
of computation. Specifically, I argued that consciousness is a medium-dependent
phenomenon generated by medium-dependent fractal and electrodynamical field
properties.
Computational systems, I argued, cannot realize human-like mediumdependent fractal and electrodynamical field properties in silicon implementation
structures and so cannot generate conscious states/processes/experiences.
Finally, I argued that the failure of computational theories of consciousness
(CTCs) suggests that the Human Mental State Multiple Realizability in Silicon Thesis
(HMSMRST) is almost certainly false.25
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